PQC Migration Roadmap
NIST standards are finalised. Here is the structured three-phase plan to migrate your organisation from quantum-vulnerable cryptography to post-quantum algorithms.
Understand what cryptography you have, where it is, and what is most at risk. Most organisations have no cryptographic inventory — this phase creates one.
- Conduct a cryptographic inventory: identify every system, service, certificate, and protocol using public-key cryptography (TLS certificates, SSH keys, VPN configs, code signing, API auth, database encryption).
- Classify by data sensitivity and secrecy period — data that must stay secret for 10+ years is highest priority.
- Assess cryptographic agility: for each system, can the algorithm be swapped via config (agile), requires code change (semi-agile), or requires redesign (brittle)?
- Prioritise: critical internet-facing TLS infrastructure first, then internal high-sensitivity systems, then lower-risk internal systems.
- Evaluate PQC-capable versions of your current tools: TLS libraries (OpenSSL 3.x), SSH (OpenSSH 9.0+), VPN (StrongSwan), certificate management.
- Identify vendor dependencies: which vendors/SaaS providers are on your PQC migration roadmap? Ask them for their timeline.
- Designate a cryptography migration owner — this cannot succeed without a named responsible person.
- Document current state as baseline for compliance and audit purposes.
Deploy hybrid classical+PQC algorithms for highest-priority systems. Hybrid provides quantum safety while maintaining backward compatibility with systems that don't yet support PQC.
- Enable X25519Kyber768 hybrid key exchange in TLS for all internet-facing web services — supported in Chrome, Firefox, Cloudflare, and AWS today.
- Enable PQC hybrid key exchange in OpenSSH 9.0+ for all SSH infrastructure (sntrup761x25519-sha512).
- Migrate high-priority VPN connections to PQC hybrid key exchange (StrongSwan, WireGuard PQ fork).
- Begin CA infrastructure upgrade — test hybrid X.509 certificates (classical + ML-DSA) using Let's Encrypt or internal CA.
- Update code signing infrastructure to support ML-DSA signatures (dual-sign with ECDSA during transition).
- Migrate key management systems (HSMs, KMS) to support ML-KEM — verify HSM vendor PQC roadmap.
- Replace AES-128 with AES-256 across all systems during this phase (separate from PQC but often done together).
- Update cryptographic libraries in all software to OQS-enabled versions (liboqs, BoringSSL, OpenSSL with OQS).
Remove hybrid classical algorithms. Operate entirely on NIST PQC algorithms. Decommission all quantum-vulnerable cryptographic infrastructure.
- Complete TLS certificate migration to pure ML-DSA or composite certificates — remove RSA/ECDSA from certificate chain.
- Decommission all RSA and ECC key pairs across PKI, SSH, VPN, and code signing infrastructure.
- Complete DNSSEC migration to ML-DSA signed zones.
- Achieve FIPS 203/204/205 compliance certification for systems requiring FIPS validation.
- Complete NSA CNSA 2.0 compliance for any systems processing classified or sensitive government data.
- Conduct post-migration cryptographic audit — verify no quantum-vulnerable algorithms remain in active use.
- Update cryptographic agility documentation — ensure future algorithm changes can be made without redesign.
- Establish ongoing cryptographic monitoring — detect any re-introduction of deprecated algorithms.
NIST PQC Standards — Finalised August 2024
| Standard | Algorithm | Former Name | Purpose | Security Levels | Key Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM | CRYSTALS-Kyber | Key encapsulation — establishing shared secrets | Level 1 (512), Level 3 (768), Level 5 (1024) | Primary KEM. Use ML-KEM-768 (Level 3) for most applications. Lattice-based (Module-LWE). |
| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA | CRYSTALS-Dilithium | Digital signatures — signing and verification | Level 2 (2), Level 3 (3), Level 5 (5) | Primary signature algorithm. Fast, well-studied. Use Level 3 for most applications. |
| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA | SPHINCS+ | Digital signatures — hash-based backup algorithm | Multiple parameter sets (fast vs small) | Larger signatures. Use when minimal implementation trust is required. Stateless hash-based. |
What happened to the other candidates?
NSA CNSA 2.0 — Mandatory for US National Security Systems
The Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0 mandates specific PQC algorithms for all systems handling classified US government data. Relevant for: US government contractors, defence suppliers, financial institutions with US government contracts, and any organisation that may need NSS compliance in future.
| Use Case | CNSA 2.0 Required Algorithm | Key Size | Deadline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Key exchange / encapsulation | ML-KEM | ML-KEM-1024 (Level 5) | By 2030 (priority systems), 2033 (all NSS) |
| Digital signatures | ML-DSA | ML-DSA-87 (Level 5) | By 2030 (priority), 2033 (all) |
| Symmetric encryption | AES | AES-256 only (AES-128 not approved) | Immediate — AES-256 only |
| Key agreement | ML-KEM | ML-KEM-1024 | By 2030 |
| Hash functions | SHA-384 or SHA-512 | N/A | Immediate for highest sensitivity |
| Software and firmware signing | ML-DSA-87 | Level 5 | By 2030 |